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Abstract
We report experimental results on a series of ten one-shot two-person 3x3
normal form games with unique equilibrium in pure strategies played by non-
economists. In contrast to previous experiments in which game theory predic-
tions fail dramatically, a majority of actions taken coincided with the equilibrium
prediction (70.2%) and were best-responses to subjects’ stated beliefs (67.2%).
In constant-sum games, 78% of actions taken were predicted by the equilibrium
model, outperforming simple K-level reasoning models. We discuss how non-
trivial game characteristics related to risk aversion, eﬃciency concerns and social
preferences may aﬀect the predictive value of diﬀerent models in simple normal
form games.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
A substantial portion of the experimental literature shows that game-theoretical predictions
do not work well in the laboratory, even when the games played are very simple.1 This is
particularly true when subjects play games for the ﬁrst time without previous experience.
However, ﬁrst time behavior is crucial to model a vast number of economic situations which
are not repeated, and it helps to identify strategic principles that may be obscured by con-
vergence in repeated play. A natural question is to identify the class of games for which game
theory predicts well when games are played for the ﬁr s tt i m ea n dt h er e a s o n sw h yi tm i g h t
fail in other games.
We aim to contribute to this question by studying play and ﬁrst-order beliefs in simple
but non-trivial games with similarities to others for which experimental evidence is mostly
negative. In particular, we study two-player 3x3 normal form games with unique equilibria in
pure strategies. We ﬁnd high percentages of equilibrium actions (70.2%) and best-responses
to (reasonably accurate) stated beliefs (67.2%).
These results contrast with previous experiments in which simple cognitive models explain
data better than the equilibrium prediction.2 Most closely related to our paper, we replicate
the previous experiment by Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2006) who found low rates of
compliance with equilibrium predictions (35%), low frequency assigned to equilibrium beliefs
(32.2%) and low percentages of best response behavior (50.5%) in a very similar experiment
with variable sum games. We here discuss some reasons why in our experiment the predictions
of Game Theory may be more successful and in particular, we compare our results in constant
s u m( C S )a n dv a r i a b l es u m( V S )g a m e s .
First, in CS games the Nash Equilibrium outcome (NE) coincides with the Maxmin (Mm)
a n dM i n m a x( mM) outcome. Thus, subjects do not necessarily need to think strategically
in order to obtain the equilibrium outcome but only choose their safest strategy, i.e., the
one that guarantees the maximum of the minimum possible payoﬀs irrespective of what
opponents choose. Therefore, comparing otherwise similar CS and VS games (in which the
NE, Mm and mM prediction do not coincide) may help us identify whether subjects use some
strategic thinking. We ﬁnd higher compliance of actions with the NE prediction in CS games
(78%), although NE still outperforms Mm and mM in VS games (61.9% vs. 55.5% and
39.5% respectively). Additionally, stated beliefs were reasonably accurate in both CS and
VS games and a majority of choices were best responses to subjects’ stated beliefs in both
treatments (69.3% in CS, 66.1% in VS). We take these results as indication that subjects
may perform some strategic thinking and that risk aversion is not a main driving force of our
results.3
1See Kagel and Roth (1995), Crawford (2002) and Camerer (2003).
2See Stahl and Wilson (1994, 1995), McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), Costa-Gomes, Crawford and Broseta
(2001), Weizsäcker (2003), Goeree and Holt (2004), Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2006) and Ivanov (2006).
3However, Ivanov (2006) estimates that only 39% of his subjects are risk-neutral in a similar experiment
with VS games.
2Second, since our experimental design includes ﬁrst-order belief elicitation we are able to
further study strategic thinking.4 We explicitly designed our games to obtain strong sepa-
ration between the NE prediction and other previously successful models assuming diﬀerent
degrees of cognitive complexity (K-level reasoning). These models approximate subjects’ cog-
nitive sophistication to whether they best respond to their beliefs about opponents’ play and
whether they form their beliefs anticipating opponents may also be strategic. Thus, the ﬁrst
degree of depth of reasoning (L1)i sd e ﬁned as best responding to uniform beliefs. Higher
degrees are deﬁned as best responding to increasing degrees of sophistication by opponents.
Although the L1 model best predicts subjects’ actions in the similar games by Costa-Gomes,
Crawford and Broseta (2001) and Costa- Gomes and Weizsäcker (2005), we ﬁnd that the
NE prediction outperforms most of these models in our CS games (78% for NE vs. 48% for
L1), while it does not perform particularly worse in the VS ones (61.9% for NE vs. 56% for
L1). Still the D1 model, assuming best responses to uniform beliefs over the set of strictly
undominated strategies, is a good predictor of actions in our games and in particular for VS
games is the best one (67%).5 We discuss diﬀerences between our games and other authors’
games to conclude that there is no universal model that best predicts behavior in simple
normal form games and we discuss which game characteristics are needed for NE to be a
good predictor of subjects’ choices.
Comparing our CS and VS treatments, allows us also to study the eﬀect of eﬃciency
concerns and social preferences on subjects’ play and ﬁrst-order beliefs. Theoretically, in CS
games behavior should not be aﬀected by eﬃciency concerns. Additionally, many forms of
social preferences should not be aﬀected as long as subjects care more for their own payoﬀs
than for those of others. On the other hand, it seems counter-intuitive that social preferences
do not play a role in CS games.6 In them, all strategic behavior refers to how to distribute
a pie of a given size and thus, how fair the distribution is should matter to subjects with
distributional concerns. Of these preconceptions, a natural one is that, everything else being
equal, subjects should get equal shares. In order to further test if distributional concerns may
be behind our results we designed a treatment in which equal splits or payoﬀsw e r ef e a s i b l e
in all games and another in which they were not. We ﬁnd that the feasibility of equal splits
did not have an impact on actions or stated beliefs.
Finally, our design also allowed for systematic variations in the degree of strict dominance
solvability of the games and on whether payoﬀs were represented by simple (one-digit) or
complex (two-digit) numbers. We ﬁnd that both issues have no particular strong eﬀect on
the predictive value of the NE model both for actions and ﬁrst order beliefs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental design and pro-
cedures. Section 3 contains the results. Section 4 concludes. The Appendix contains the
4Our belief elicitation method replicates the methods previously used by Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker
(2006).
5Our games were speciﬁcally designed such that the NE and L1 prediction never coincided. Although we
aimed for separation between all other models, their predictions coincided in some games so general conclusions
about the relative predictive power of other models must be cautious.
6And in particular there is ample evidence that social preferences may play a role in dictator games.
3games.
2 Experimental Design and Procedures
2.1 Experimental design
Subjects were presented with a series of ten 3x3 Normal Form Games with Unique Equilibrium
in Pure Strategies.
Games are classiﬁed according to whether they are (strictly) dominance solvable or not.
Eight of the ten games oﬀered were dominance solvable. Games 1R and 1C are dominance
solvable with one round of dominance to reach the equilibrium for one of the players (Row in
1R, Column in 1C) and two rounds of dominance for the other player. Games 2R and 2C are
solvable with two rounds for one player and three rounds for the other. Games 3R and 3C
are solvable with three rounds of dominance for one player and two for the other, although
the ﬁrst deletion of strictly dominated strategies is simultaneous for both players. Games 4R
and 4C are solvable with four rounds for one player and three rounds for the other. Finally,
Games NDR and NDC are not dominance solvable and have no strictly dominated actions.7
We selected 3x3 games in which the prediction of how subjects would play would not
be trivial. As in previous experiments, our games were designed in order to obtain strong
separation between Nash Equilibrium choices (NE) and the choices predicted by the following
previously partially successful models of cognitive reasoning (K-level thinking) and other
plausible models. L1 predicts best-responses against uniform beliefs on opponents’ strategies.
L2 predicts best-responses to L1 beliefs while L3 predicts best-responses to L2 beliefs. D1
predicts a best response against uniform beliefs over the opponents’ undominated actions.
Maximax (MM) predicts choosing the action leading to the player’s highest possible payoﬀ.
Maxmin (Mm) and Minmax (mM) correspond to choosing the action leading to the maximum
of the minimum payoﬀs (respectively the minimum of the maximum payoﬀs of the other
player). Eﬃcient (Ef ) implies choosing the action proﬁle including the highest sum of both
subject roles’ payoﬀs.
We used a 2x2x2 design with treatments created according to three criteria. The ﬁrst
criterion was whether the games were constant-sum or not. In the CS treatments all ten
games were constant-sum, while in the VS treatments they were not. Equivalent games
in both treatments were designed such that degrees of strict dominance solvability and the
prediction of the models we compare were not aﬀected. Notice that in the CS treatment Mm
and mM would predict the same choice as NE and Ef would predict any choice. Thus, we
abuse notation and use Mm, mM and Ef to refer to the unique prediction of those models
in the VS treatment.
The second criterion was whether an equal split of payoﬀs was feasible in all ten games.
7In the CS treatments, games 1R, 2R, 2C, 3R and NDC have additional weakly dominated actions, while
in the VS treatments this occurs only in games 2C and 3R. Weak dominance solvability may have had an
eﬀect on the percentage of equilibrium actions chosen and stated beliefs, although in our small sample size we
did not ﬁnd statistical diﬀerences.
4In the F treatments an equal split of payoﬀs was feasible following a particular combination
of subjects’ actions, diﬀerent for each game. In the U treatments the same combination of
strategies leads to an unequal split of payoﬀs. “Equivalent” games in both treatments were
designed respecting (strict) dominance solvability and the models’ predictions. Additional
requirements were that the equal split in the F treatments was never the result of both
subjects choosing the NE strategy and that it changed whether the Row or Column player
earned more than the equal split of payoﬀsi nt h eUt r e a t m e n t s .
A ﬁnal criterion was whether payoﬀs were represented by “simple” or “complex”-digit
numbers. In the 1D treatments all payoﬀs were represented by numbers in the interval
[1,11], while in the 2D treatments the same numbers were multiplied by 7, possibly making
calculations of best-responses a more diﬃcult task.8
Table I below shows the number of rounds of dominance solvability for each game and
subject role, the prediction of each of the models we compare and the action proﬁle which
was changed by the equal split in the F treatments (Eq).
Table I: Games by Rounds of Dominance and Models’ Predictions
Game Dominance NE L1 L2 L3 D1 MM Eq Mm mM Ef
1R (1,2) D-R D-L D-R D-R D-R D-L M-L D-C M-R D-R
1C (2,1) D-R M-R D-R D-R D-R U-R D-L M-R D-C U-R
2R (2,3) U-R M-L U-L U-R U-L M-L U-L U-L M-R D-C
2C (3,2) D-C U-C D-C D-C U-C U-R D-L D-L U-C U-L
3R (3,2) U - CD - CU - CU - CU - CD - CU-L D-C U-L D-R
3C (2,3) M-R M-C D-R M-R M-R D-C D-R M-C D-L M-R
4R (4,3) D-L D-R D-L D-L D-L M-R M-L M-L M-R U-R
4C (3,4) U-L M-L U-L U-L M-L M-C M-L M-L M-L M-C
NDR No M-C M-R D-R D-L M-R U-R D-R M-L M-R U-L
NDC No M-R D-R M-C U-C D-R D-L U-C U-R D-R D-L
2.2 Experimental Procedures
The experiment was carried out with pen and paper in the ELSE laboratory during April
2004 and November 2006. Subjects were recruited by E-mail using the ELSE database, which
mainly consists of UCL undergraduate and graduate students. We only recruited subjects
who had neither taken courses in Game Theory nor Economics and who had no previous
experience in game experiments.
We performed eight sessions, one per each combination of treatments, and each with
twenty subjects. In each session, ten subjects were randomly assigned “Row” roles in all ten
games, while the other ten subjects were assigned “Column” roles. No subject was aware of
their role as all games were presented from the point of view of row players.
Upon arrival, subjects were randomly assigned seats and were asked to read some prelim-
inary instructions. Then, subjects were required to pass an Understanding Test. No subject
8Huck and Weizsäcker (1999) discuss the eﬀects of similar manipulations in payoﬀs.
5failed the test. Finally, the experiment started. Ten games were presented in random and
diﬀerent order to each subject to control for (possible) non-feedback learning. Subjects ﬁrst
read the instructions about how to choose their actions, and then played all ten games (Part
I). After Part I, answer sheets were collected and subjects read the instructions on beliefs.
Next, they stated their beliefs for all 10 games (Part II). This procedure guaranteed that all
actions were chosen before beliefs had been mentioned.9
For each game, subjects were randomly and anonymously paired with a diﬀerent partici-
pant. Subjects had no feedback on other subjects’ actions.
Subjects were paid for both tasks according to one randomly selected game. Actions
were rewarded exactly by the amount of pounds indicated by the number selected combining
their action and their matched participant’s action in this game.10 Stated beliefs were paid
according to a Quadratic Scoring Rule (QSR) which rewarded the accuracy of predictions.11
The QSR was designed such that subjects could earn comparatively less money with their
belief statements than with their action choices (Maximum of £2 and £11 respectively) in
order to reduce the incentive for risk averse subjects to not take best response actions aiming
to average payoﬀs.12
Subjects were paid the sum of a £5 ﬁxed fee, plus their earnings for choosing actions and
stating beliefs. Average payments were £12.87. Each session lasted one hour and subjects
were allocated forty minutes to perform both tasks.
3 Experimental Results
3.1 Treatment Eﬀects
Table II reports the average percentage of Nash Equilibrium actions and best-responses to
stated beliefs by subject role in each of the treatments. A ﬁrst look reveals no important
diﬀerences among subject roles, no diﬀerences between the 1D and 2D treatments neither
between the F and U treatments. However, it seems that whether the games were constant-
sum or variable sum made a diﬀerence, specially in the percentage of equilibrium actions.
While overall 78.4% of actions taken in the CS treatments coincided with the equilibrium
prediction, only 61.9% did so in the VS treatment. In the CS treatments, 69.4% of the
actions were best-responses to stated beliefs, while in the VS treatments 64.9% of actions
were best-responses.
9Additional sessions with CS1D games were run eliciting beliefs immediately before playing each game. We
did not ﬁnd statistical diﬀerences in actions nor in reported beliefs when grouping the data with respect to
other treatments. These tests are not very powerful given the sample size. In any case, eliciting actions before
beliefs may be a strong test, not a weaker one, for equilibrium play. While Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker
(2006) do not ﬁnd statistical diﬀerences in the order of tasks, Ivanov (2006) does ﬁnd some diﬀerences.
10This number was divided by 7 in the 2D treatments.
11With a ﬁnite population of subjects, QSRs are not necessarily incentive compatible. In any case, expected
payoﬀ maximizers can do no better by stating diﬀerent beliefs than their true beliefs and given our results,
the problem is minor. For a discussion on QSRs see Oﬀerman and Sonnemans (2001).
12Instructions together with the quadratic scoring ru l eu s e dt or e w a r de l i c i t e db e l i e f sa r ea v a i l a b l ea t
http://pareto.uab.es/prey/instructionsweb.pdf.
6Table II: Percentages of Equilibrium Actions and best-responses by Treatments
% of Equilibrium Actions % of best-responses
Row 1D 2D Row 1D 2D
FU FU FU FU
CS 78 89 CS 74 74 CS 65 70 CS 64 75
VS 58 74 VS 65 58 VS 65 64 VS 67 65
Column 1D 2D Column 1D 2D
FU FU FU FU
CS 84 76 CS 71 81 CS 64 67 CS 83 67
VS 55 64 VS 66 55 VS 57 61 VS 74 66
To conﬁrm which treatments had an eﬀect on subjects’ behavior, we use Fisher’s Exact
Probability Test for count data (FEPT). This test checks whether diﬀerences in observed
proportions of actions (beliefs) between two treatments might be expected by chance, under
the two-tailed null hypothesis of equal probability between observed proportions.
We start with actions and proceed by steps.13 We ﬁrst compare actions taken by the
same subject roles in equivalent games varying in just one aspect of the treatments. For
example to test whether equal splits made a diﬀerence, we compare the aggregate number
of actions taken by Row subjects in each pair of “equivalent” games in the CS1DF and the
CS1DU treatments. We ﬁnd no statistical eﬀect of equal splits nor of the number of digits
representing payoﬀs at the 5% signiﬁcance level. We ﬁnd, however, signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between constant and variable sum games (11 out of 80 comparisons). We use this result
to collapse data on the treatment eﬀects not being tested and perform stronger FEPTs.
Following our example, we now compare the aggregate observed proportions of play by Row
players in pairs of otherwise equivalent games between the CSF and the CSU treatments.
We again ﬁnd no diﬀerences emerging from the equal splits nor from the number of digits
representing payoﬀs, but diﬀerences between the constant and variable sum games at the 5%
signiﬁcance level (8 out of 40 comparisons). Using this result, we ﬁnally collapse all data
and conduct FEPTs comparing proportions of actions the CS and VS treatments by game
and subject role, and we again ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences (5 out of 20 comparisons). We
thus conclude that whether games were constant-sum or variable sum had an eﬀect on the
proportions of actions chosen, while other treatment eﬀects were not signiﬁcant.
Moving on to stated beliefs, we classify each subjects’ belief statements into one of four
categories: for each of the three actions all the stated beliefs that assigned (strictly) more
than half of the frequency to an action were classiﬁed in the same category (thus creating
three groups), and the last category comprises all beliefs which do not assign more than half
of the frequency to any of the three actions opponents can take. We proceed similarly as with
13Although FEPT is speciﬁcally designed for small samples it is still not a very powerful test with only ten
observations in each treatment. For example using this test, we cannot reject that the distribution (3,2,5) in
one treatment is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than the distribution (1,7,2) in another treatment. The power of the
test increases with the number of observations and thus why we proceed by steps.
7actions, by progressively collapsing data when no signiﬁcant treatment eﬀects and using the
5% signiﬁcance level. We again conclude that whether games were constant-sum or not was
the only treatment eﬀect which made a statistical diﬀerence in the observed proportions of
beliefs stated.
Using these results, we aggregate data from diﬀerent treatments and we study diﬀerences
b e t w e e nt h eC Sa n dV St r e a t m e n t s .
3.2 Actions
NE is a good predictor of subjects’ actions in the CS games, while it is not as good in the
VS ones. Using McNemar’s tests, we ﬁnd no clear pattern between the number of rounds
of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies required to reach the equilibrium and
the percentage of equilibrium actions played across games in both treatments. For example,
in both treatments games 1R and 1C show a statistically signiﬁcant lower percentage of
equilibrium actions than games 3C or 4R at the 5% level. Crawford (2004) argues that in
their initial responses to games subjects seldom play dominated strategies but usually respect
at most three of four rounds of iterated dominance. Our results do not contradict this claim.
In any case, conclusions on this result should be cautious given the power of the test used
and the existence of some weakly dominated strategies in some games.14
We now compare how well NE predicted actions taken in comparison to other models.
Table III shows the percentage of actions taken that were predicted by the equilibrium model,
together with the percentage predicted by each of the other models described in section 2.1.
Table III: Percentage of Actions Matched by Models’ Predictions
Treatment Subject NE L1 L2 L3 D1 MM Eq Mm mM Ef
CS Row 79 42 68 70 65 20 47 50 37 25
Column 78 54 69 69 73 30 41 47 46 29
Average 78.44 86 8 .56 9 .56 9 2 5 44 48.54 1 .52 7
VS Row 64 56 52 58 66 37 36 49 42 38
Column 60 56 65 60 68 41 43 62 37 42
Average 61.95 65 8 .55 96 73 939.5 55.53 9 .54 0
Table III shows that NE clearly outperforms the predictions of the other models for both
subject roles in the CS treatment.15 NE performs similarly as the other models in the VS
treatments, although D1 is the best predictor. It is noticeable that L1 and L2,w h i c hw e r e
two of the most successful models in Costa-Gomes & Weizsäcker (2006), perform worse than
NE, even in the VS treatment. Notice that L2 predicts the same outcome as NE in six games,
while L1 does not predict the same outcome as NE in any game. Thus, we should not directly
infer that L2 captures behavior better than L1, when such coincidences do not occur. L3
coincides with NE in all but Games NDR and NDC, where it performs signiﬁcantly worse
14Ia mg r a t e f u lt oar e f e r e ef o rp o i n t i n go u tt h i s .
15When data are not pooled across treatments, only in 5 out of 80 comparisons and only for one subject
role the NE model is outperformed by other models.
8in the CS treatment (64.5% vs. 20% for the subject role whose actions diﬀer). D1 predicts
the same action as NE for ﬁve of the ten games. In the ﬁve games where the predictions of
both models are diﬀerent, NE outperforms D1 in all games in the CS treatments (67.2% vs.
29%). However, D1 is the model which best predicts data in the VS, where it outperforms
NE (for the games for which the predictions do not coincide, NE predicts 41.6% of actions
while L1 predicts 56%). Notice that all other models (MM, Eq, Mm, mM and Ef ) are worse
predictors in both treatments. Finally, notice that Mm and mM are not particularly good
predictors of behavior in the VS treatments where they even perform worse than NE.T h u s ,
n o ta l lt h ee ﬀect of the high percentage of NE choices in the CS treatments may be due to
the fact that the predictions of NE, Mm and mM coincide in constant sum games.
We now look at individual behavior. In the CS treatment, the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) of the percentage of subjects who played at least a certain number of games
according to each models’ predictions shows that while 21.25% of the subjects played accord-
ing to the NE prediction in all ten games, at most only 3.75% of the subjects played in all
ten games according to any of the other models here studied. In the CS treatment 82.5% of
subjects chose at least 7 actions according to NE. In contrast, in the VS treatment, only 41%
of subjects chose NE action at least in 7 games.
Second, Table IV classiﬁes subjects according to the model whose predicted action sub-
jects chose in the highest number of games. First, a total of 102 subjects out of 160 (50 in the
CS treatment, 52 in the VS treatment) could clearly be classiﬁed according to this criterion,
i.e., they responded the highest number of times according to only one model (“Clear Cases”).
Of these, 62% of subjects in the CS treatment and only 13% in the VS were classiﬁed as NE.
Of the 58 subjects whose number of predictions tied between two models, most (35% in CS,
17% in VS) tied between NE and some other model (“Ties”). Finally, the column “Overall”
adds up both clear cases and ties to conclude that 70% of the 80 subjects in the CS treatment
can be classiﬁed as NE, while only 24% of subjects in the VS treatments are NE.N o t i c et h a t
34% of subjects in the VS treatment are classiﬁed as D1, which is the model that on average
best predict behavior in the VS treatment. Table IV also shows in parenthesis the average
number of games in which subjects classiﬁed in each model category chose actions according
to each model. Results show that the classiﬁcation was consistent.16
16Had subjects chosen randomly they would have answered on average in 3.3 games according to each model
and, given the structure of the games, the average intensity of subjects classiﬁed in each category would have
been 5.1.
9Table IV: % of Subjects Classiﬁed by Models’ Actions Most Taken and Consistency
Model Clear Cases Ties Overall
CS VS CS VS CS VS
NE 62(9.3) 13(8.4) 35(7.8) 17(8.1) 70(8.6) 24(8.5)
L1 6(9.3) 15(8.3) 1(7) 10(6.1) 5(7.6) 19(7.3)
L2 12(8.3) 6(8.5) 14(7.9) 12(8.1) 20(8.3) 14(8.3)
L3 6(7.7) 8(7.3) 17(7.7) 12(8) 19(7.7) 15(7.7)
D1 10(8.8) 33(8.9) 18(8.2) 15(7) 22(8.3) 34(8.4)
MM 06 ( 6 .7) 1(3) 9(6) 1(3) 11(6.2)
Eq 2(10) 0 8(6.8) 0 9(7.3) 0
Mm 2(7) 15(8.3) 0 14(6.3) 1(7.2) 23(7)
mM 00 4(5.7) 3(6) 4(5.8) 3(5.7)
Ef 04 ( 7 ) 1(3) 9(6.3) 1(6.1) 10(3)
Given that the Mm and mM prediction coincides with the equilibrium prediction in
constant-sum games, we can not discard that the high percentage of subjects classiﬁed as
NE behaved non-strategically and chose Maxmin as a safe strategy. In variable sum games
subjects’ classiﬁcation shows a high degree of heterogeneity. However, notice that similar
percentages of subjects in the VS treatments can be classiﬁed as NE and Mm.
3.3 Stated Beliefs
On average, subjects believed equilibrium actions would be played with higher frequency than
the other two actions available to opponents. However, they believed equilibrium actions
would be played with lower frequency by their opponents than they were actually played.
Table V compares the average frequency assigned to the predictions of the NE model with
the other ones. Subjects expected on average that their opponents would play according to
the NE prediction with higher frequency than according to the other compared models in
the CS treatment (57%), but not so much in the VS one (48.5%) where D1 obtained highest
frequency (51.5%). Overall, the predictive success of all models is more similar for beliefs
than for actions.
Table V: Average Frequency of Stated Beliefs on Models’ Predictions
Treatment Subject NE L1 L2 L3 D1 MM Eq Mm mM Ef
CS Row 55 50 53 51 55 39 39 43 36 30
Column 59 47 51 52 57 33 39 44 44 29
Average 57 48.55 25 1 .55 6 3 639 42 40 29.5
VS Row 49 50 48 49 51 44 36 51 33 40
Column 48 50 41 44 52 44 36 43 45 40
Average 48.55 04 4 .54 6 .55 1 .54 436 47 39 40
10Frequencies assigned to equilibrium play were disperse, ranging from 71.5% by column
subjects in game 1R in the CS treatment, to 36.75% by row subjects in the same game
and treatment. Wilcoxon tests at the 5% signiﬁcance level conﬁrmed there was not a clear
pattern between the number of rounds of strict iterated dominance and the frequency assigned
to equilibrium actions by opponents in both treatments.
As observed in previous experiments17 stated beliefs were conservative, in the sense that
the empirical distribution of beliefs was ﬂatter than the distribution of actions played. The
proportion of belief statements that assigned frequency one to all ten opponents playing one
particular strategy was 10.63% in the CS treatments and 8% in the VS ones. Tendency to
conservatism does not mean however that subjects believed all actions by their opponents
were equally probable. The percentage of uniform belief statements18 was only of 8.25 in the
CS treatments and 6.75 in the VS ones. Much lower, in fact, than the percentage of belief
statements that assigned zero frequency to at least one of the opponents’ actions (46.5% in
CS and 43.75 in VS). This may be a ﬁrst indication that stating beliefs was a meaningful
task for subjects.
We assess the accuracy of belief statements in the aggregate by looking at the aggregate
ordering of frequencies. The percentages of games in which, on average, subjects guessed
correctly which action was played with highest frequency by their opponents and at the same
time which one with lowest frequency was 77.5% in the CS treatments and 66.25% in the VS
ones. However, when looking at individual subjects, these patterns do not translate well into
individual behavior across games. Only 32% of the total individual belief statements in the CS
treatments and 30.63% in the VS ones guessed the observed ordering of frequencies played
correctly. The average mean square error deviation of stated beliefs was 31.03 in the CS
treatments and 28.16 in the VS ones, out of a feasible range of [0,66.6]. On average, subjects
guessed the correct ordering of frequencies in 4.3 games in the CS treatments (4.4 in VS).
Thus we conclude that although stated beliefs were reasonable accurate on the aggregate,
they were not so accurate at the individual level.
3.4 Best Response of Actions to Stated Beliefs
We ﬁnally check for consistency between actions and beliefs by analyzing whether actions
chosen were best replies to stated beliefs. We deﬁne best replying behavior as choosing
the action that gives the highest expected payoﬀ given the distribution of beliefs stated.
According to this deﬁnition, best replying implies that subjects’ utilities only depend on own
monetary payoﬀs and that subjects are risk neutral. Results below show that a majority of
subjects best replied to their stated beliefs in both treatments.
First, subjects clearly best responded to their stated beliefs more often than they would
have had they chosen their actions randomly. Chi-Square Goodness of Fit Tests comparing
the empirical cumulative distribution functions (CDF) to the CDF implied by random be-
havior gives p-values of virtually zero. Overall, subjects best responded to their stated beliefs
17See Huck and Weizsäcker (2001) and Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2006).
18Deﬁn e da ss t a t e m e n t st h a ta s s i g n e df r e q u e n c yo f3t ot w oa c t i o n sa n d4t ot h eo t h e ro n e .
11in 69.25% of the CS games while in 66.13% in the VS ones. Notice that these percentages
are higher than the 50% observed in Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2004), even in the VS
treatment.19 Second-best-responses were also more frequent (21.25% in CS, 24.75% in VS)
than worst responses (9.5% in CS and 9.12% in VS). We also observe that subjects were more
likely to best respond when the average diﬀerence in payoﬀs between best response and other
actions was higher (correlation coeﬃcient of 24.77 for all treatments).
Comparing the percentage of best-responses across games for all subjects using McNemar’s
test (5% signiﬁcance level), we again observe the familiar pattern that the number of rounds
of strict iterated dominance does not aﬀect in a clear way the percentage of best replies. At
an individual level, 63.75% of subjects best responded to their stated beliefs in seven or more
games in the CS treatments, although only 55% did so in the VS treatment.
Although the proportion of non-best response behavior is not insigniﬁcant, it is small.
We look into the nature of non-best response behavior by calculating how much subjects
(hypothetically) lost for not best responding to their stated beliefs.
We proceed by calculating for each subject, how much they lost on average over all ten
games by taking the actions they took instead of the actions that would have been their best
response given the empirical distribution of their stated beliefs.20 We ﬁnd that subjects in
the CS treatment lost on average £0.17 per game (£0.22 in VS). Given that subjects were
only paid for their actions in one game, these were the average losses per subject. Next,
we calculate the average maximum feasible loss had subjects have played, in all games, the
action that gave them the lowest possible expected payoﬀ, given their stated beliefs. On
average, subjects in the CS treatment could have lost £1.2 per game (£1.4 in VS). This
means that subjects in the CS treatment lost on average 14.2% of the maximum loss they
could have incurred due to not best responding (17.1% in VS). Alternatively, subjects in the
CS treatment would have lost on average £0.57 had they made an uniform random choice
in all ten games (£0.69 in VS). Therefore, subjects in the CS treatment lost 29% due to not
best responding of what they would have lost had they randomly chosen their actions given
their stated beliefs (31.9% in VS).
4 Discussion
This paper shows a set of games for which the unique Nash equilibrium may be a good
predictor of subjects’ choices and in which a high percentage of subjects’ actions are best
responses to their beliefs of opponents’ play. In our games, especially when they are constant
sum, the equilibrium prediction also outperforms the predictions of previously successful
cognitive models based on k-level thinking, more prominently and given our design, L1.
Our study replicates the methods used in previous studies in which the equilibrium model
has proved less successful. Thus, diﬀerences in our results may be caused by diﬀerences in
19Some of the weakly dominance relationships previously mentioned may be partially behind this result.
Notice also that games NDR and NDC and 3C (in the VS treatments) use the same payoﬀ vector for several
outcomes.
20Notice that this calculation does not use the empirical observed choices by opponents.
12our games. We speciﬁcally designed our games such that we could observe the eﬀects of
social preferences, cognitive complexity and risk aversion in play and beliefs. Thus, while
maintaining many other game characteristics with respect to previous studies, we designed
treatments diﬀering in games being constant or variable sum, the feasibility of equal splits
and the number of digits that represent payoﬀst ol o o mi n t ot h e s ei s s u e s .H o w e v e r ,o u rg a m e s
may have also altered other game characteristics which have shown to be important for the
predictive value of diﬀerent models. For example, given the restrictions imposed by our
treatments, our games also diﬀered in the degree of separation allowed between the diﬀerent
models we compare. There may be many other sources of diﬀerences between our games
and others’ games which may be behind our results. For example, payoﬀ diﬀerences between
subjects or between strategies, degrees of weak dominance solvability or the physical location
in the game form representation of the strategies predicted by diﬀerent models. However,
notice that none of these diﬀerences deﬁne the reasoning process behind Nash equilibrium
or K-level thinking. Therefore, there may be some aspect of subjects’ real reasoning process
which is not well captured by any of these models.
Our results, together with previous studies, indicate that there may not exist a universal
simple model explaining subjects’ behavior across diﬀerent simple normal form games when
played for the ﬁr s tt i m e . I tm a ye v e nb ep o s s i b l et h a tf o rd i ﬀerent games a majority of
subjects use diﬀerent strategic processes. For example, diﬀerences between our constant sum
and variable sum treatments may be an indication of this. We have here shown evidence
that under some circumstances the unique Nash equilibrium may still be a good predictor of
behavior, and that K-level models may not predict behavior as well in some simple games.
Thus, we can not discard that subjects under some circumstances may be more strategic
than previously thought, since the percentage of best responses across our games is also high.
Further comparative research should follow.
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146A p p e n d i x : T h e G a m e s
6.1 Constant-Sum Games
The following ten games correspond to the CS1DU treatments. Games for the two-digit (2D)
treatments are obtained by multiplying payoﬀs by 7. Games for the equal (F) treatments are
obtained by substituting the payoﬀso ft h e“ Eq” combination of strategies of Table I by 6
(42 in the 2D treatments).
Game 1R Game 1C
LCR LCR
U 3,9 4,8 5,7 U 10,2 2,10 1,11
M 5,7 7,5 7,5 M 9,3 8,4 2,10
D 9,3 9,3 8,4 D 7,5 4,8 3,9
Game 2R Game 2C
LCR LCR
U 5,7 5,7 4,8 U 11,1 4,8 7,5
M 2,10 11,1 3,9 M 4,8 4,8 1,11
D 1,11 10,2 3,9 D 7,5 5,7 7,5
Game 3R Game 3C
LCR LCR
U 5,7 4,8 5,7 U 9,3 1,11 8,4
M 3,9 1,11 4,8 M 10,2 10,2 9,3
D 3,9 3,9 11,1 D 8,4 11,1 7,5
Game 4R Game 4C
LCR LCR
U 4,8 2,10 1,11 U 7,5 8,4 9,3
M 5,7 11,1 4,8 M 5,7 11,1 9,3
D 7,5 8,4 10,2 D 3,9 1,11 10,2
Game NDR Game NDC
LCR LCR
U 8,4 5,7 1,11 U 1,11 7,5 3,9
M 5,7 5,7 5,7 M 4,8 4,8 4,8
D 2,10 5,7 7,5 D 8,4 2,10 3,9
156.2 Variable Sum Games
The following ten games correspond to the VS1DU treatments. Games for the two-digit (2D)
treatments are obtained by multiplying payoﬀs by 7. Games for the equal (F) treatments
are obtained by substituting the payoﬀso ft h e“ Eq” combination of strategies of Table I by
equal one-digit numbers (two-digits in the 2D treatments) such that the predictions of all the
models considered in Table I are satisﬁed.
Game 1R Game 1C
LCR LCR
U 1,9 2,6 4,3 U 10,2 2,10 7,11
M 4,4 5,4 5,4 M 7,3 6,4 7,10
D 7,3 7,5 6,8 D 6,6 1,7 9,8
Game 2R Game 2C
LCR LCR
U 6,6 4,8 4,9 U 11,1 1,8 7,5
M 4,8 11,3 3,5 M 4,8 4,8 1,11
D 1,10 10,6 3,8 D 6,5 5,7 2,5
Game 3R Game 3C
LCR LCR
U 6,6 7,8 2,4 U 6,1 2,8 4,2
M 2,8 1,10 4,6 M 7,1 10,4 9,7
D 3,9 3,9 11,5 D 5,1 11,3 5,5
Game 4R Game 4C
LCR LCR
U 4,3 2,8 8,11 U 5,6 2,3 7,2
M 6,6 11,1 5,7 M 4,4 10,3 7,2
D 10,8 4,3 9,2 D 2,7 1,8 8,1
Game NDR Game NDC
LCR LCR
U 8,6 2,6 1,11 U 3,10 5,5 3,9
M 4,6 7,6 3,6 M 4,9 2,9 4,9
D 2,7 2,5 4,4 D 9,5 3,8 2,7
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